Abstract. This paper presents three curious findings about deterministic public-key encryption (D-PKE) that further our understanding of its security, in particular because of the contrast with standard, randomized public-key encryption (R-PKE):
Introduction
Public-key encryption (PKE) schemes are usually randomized, in order to achieve goals like IND-CPA [29] . BBO [5] introduced deterministic PKE (D-PKE), arguing that it offers practical benefits over randomized PKE (R-PKE) in certain applications. These include efficient search on encrypted databases [5] and resilience in the face of the low-quality randomness that pervades systems [6, 41] .
provide a definition PRIV of "best possible" security for D-PKE, and ROM constructions achieving it. Equivalent, IND-style formulations appear in [10] . These definitions are unusual, and achieving them in the standard model (SM) is challenging. Emerging as a practically-motivated notion of theoretical depth and interest, D-PKE has attracted significant foundational work as researchers aim to understand the properties and achievability of the basic definitions and variants [10, 11, 19, 20, 28, 33, 39] . We continue this line of work.
Our work. This paper shows that determinism impacts security in beyondobvious ways. Specifically, we consider three questions. The first is whether security in the standard model implies security in the ROM. The second is whether D-PKE is secure under selective-opening attack. The last is whether single-user security implies multi-user security. Fig. 1 summarizes our findings, which are discussed in more depth below. On the practical side, our work indicates that care must be taken in the use of D-PKE. On the theoretical side it indicates further foundational subtleties for D-PKE, and, more broadly, for multi-stage security definitions, in the wake of those already indicated in [40, 42] .
Background. In R-PKE, the encryption algorithm Enc takes the public (encryption) key pk , message m and coins r to return a ciphertext c = Enc(pk , m; r). The basic notion of security is IND-CPA [7, 29] . An adversary is a pair (A 1 , A 2 ) of PT algorithms. The game picks keys (pk , sk ) and a challenge bit b. We run We run A 1 (it does not get pk ) to get a pair (m 0 , m 1 ) of vectors of messages (but no state information). The game computes challenge ciphertext vector c = Enc(pk , m b ), encryption being component-wise, and runs A 2 on c, pk to get a bit b . Security requires that 2 Pr[b = b ] − 1 is negligible. Important restrictions are that (1) A 1 does not get the public key (2) each individual message in the vectors m 0 , m 1 has high min-entropy, meaning is statistically unpredictable, and (3) A 1 , A 2 do not communicate directly, meaning no state information is passed from A 1 to A 2 . These restrictions are necessary, for without them security is not achievable.
In the ROM [14] , both stages of the adversary have access to the random oracle RO, whether for R-PKE or D-PKE. In the latter case, the min-entropy condition is required to hold even given (conditioned on) the RO. Does SM-security imply ROM-security? That security in the standard model (SM) implies security in the ROM appears to be a triviality or tautology, true for any primitive. To be specific, suppose we have a standard-model R-PKE scheme, meaning the algorithms of the scheme make no calls to RO. Suppose it is IND-CPA in the SM. Then it is IND-CPA in the ROM. Intuitively this seems clear because if the scheme does not use the RO, then giving the adversary access to RO cannot violate security. If we want to prove the claim formally, we could do so by reduction. Given a ROM adversary (A 1 , A 2 ), we build SM adversary
